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NOTES AND COMMENTS

and development, 27 and religious welfare of the child28 and in addition,

the character and feelings of the parties desiring custody.29 Furthermore, a decision in this type of case involves judicial discretion. Being
familiar with the surrounding circumstances, hearing the testimony,
seeing the witnesses, and interviewing the child are all matters which
place the trial court in a better position to determine what is for the
child's best interest, and its decision should not be lightly overturned.3 0
In the light of the above discussion, it is submitted that a parent
should not be denied the custody of his child without a good and sufficient cause, but in determining whether such cause does in fact exist,
all factors affecting the welfare of the child should be considered.
RODDEY M. LIGON, JR.

Federal Jurisdiction-Removal-Separate and Independent
Claim or Cause of Action

Suit divisibility as a basis for removal to the federal courts has long
been available to non-resident defendants who were joined with resident
defendants in a single action. The act of July 27, 1866, brought into
being the right of these defendants to remove on the ground of "separable controversy."' At this time the case was split into two parts, with
the part involving the non-resident defendant removed to the federal
court and the part involving the resident defendant left in the state
court. It was not until the act of March 3, 1875, that the removal of
the entire suit was allowed where a "separable controversy" was found
to exist. 2 Under the last act the court was permitted, upon removal, to
remand in whole or in part as justice required. This last revision continued in substantially the same form until September 1, 1948. 3 During
gins v. Scoggins, 80 N. C. 319 (1897); Haskell v. Haskell, 152 Mass. 16, 24 N. E.
859 (1890).
" See Scoggins v. Scoggins, supra note 24, where three girls awarded to mother
and one boy to father.
- Lancey v. Shelley, 232 Iowa 187, 2 N. W. 2d 781 (1942) ; Dunkin v. Siefert,
123 Iowa 64, 98 N. W. 558 (1904) ; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 93 Kan. 613, 144 Pac.
840 (1914) ; Weinman, The Trial Judge Awards Cuistody, 10 LAW AND CONTEMP.
PRoB. 721, 733 (1944).
"'See Spears v. Snell, 74 N. C. 210, 213 (1876); Dunkin v. Siefert, supra
note 26.
" Atkinson v. Downing, 175 N. C. 244, 95 S. E. 487 (1918) ; Moore v. Dozier,
128 Ga. 90, 57 S. E. 110 (1907) ; Friedman, The ParentalRight to Control the
Religious Education of a Child, 29 HAxv. L. R. 485, 488 (1916).
20 Sheers v. Stein, 75 Wis. 44, 43 N. W. 728 (1889).
Pappas v. Pappas and Elkin v. Pappas, 208 N. C. 220, 197 S. E. 661 (1935);
Clegg v. Clegg, 186 N. C. 28, 118 S. E. 824 (1923); In re Rosa Gray Hamilton,
182 N. C. 44, 108 S. E. 385 (1921) ; Stokes v. Cogdell, 153 N. C. 181, 69 S. E. 65
(1910) ; Pra v. Gherardini, 34 N. Mex. 587, 286 Pac. 828 (1930).
'14 STAT. 306 (1866).
18 STAT. 470 (1875).
136 STAT. 1094 (1911). "And when in any suit mentioned in this section there
shall be a controversy which is wholly between citizens of different States, and
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this period the question of whether a "separable controversy" was contained in a given action continually afforded one of the most perplexing
problems of federal jurisdiction.
One approach to the problem of determining the existence of a
separable controversy within a suit has been on the basis of parties.4
According to this view, when the joinder of defendants is permissive
rather than necessary, then the nonresident defendant so joined may
remove the whole case on the ground that it contains a separable controversy as to him. Thus, in a proceeding against several insurers who
were members of an association which insured the plaintiff's property,
the non-resident defendants were allowed to remove the entire case to
the federal courts. 5
During the process of development of removal jurisdiction under
the separable controversy statute, the courts evidently believed that in
certain types of actions all of the case should not be removed to the
federal courts. Thus they devised the "separate controversy" concept,
which allowed the federal courts to retain only a part of the case and to
remand the remainder. The cases so split up were those which involved
joinder of distinct claims and not merely joinder of parties.0 Hence,
an action by a railroad corporation to condemn land for a right of way
was separate as to the claim or cause of action against each individual
landowner of tracts along the way. The non-resident defendant landowners were allowed to remove that portion of the case as between themselves and the railroad, but the remainder of the case was remanded to
7
the state court.
which can be fully determined as between them, then either one or more of the
defendants actually interested in such controversy may remove said suit into the
district court of the United States for the proper district." This statute was
familiarly known as the "separable controversy" statute. For historical sketch,

see 3 MOORE,
'3 MooRE,

FEDERAL PRACtiCE
FEDERAL PRAcTIcE

§101.02 (2d ed. 1948).
§101.06 (2d ed. 1948).

'Des Moines Elev. & Grain Co. v. Underwriter's Grain Ass'n., 63 F. 2d 103
(8th Cir. 1933); cf. Texas Employer's Ins. Ass'n. v. Felt, 150 F. 2d 227 (5th
Cir. 1945) (action brought in alternative against three insurance carriers because
uncertain as to who was employer at time of worker's accident); Branchville
Motor Co. v. American Surety Co. of N. Y., 27 F. 2d 631 (E. D. S. C. 1928)
(suit against surety on bond joined with action in tort against insured's employee).
For excellent discussion see Note, The Content of "Separable Controversy" for
Purpose of Removal to Federal Courts, 36 CoL. L. Rxv. 788 (1936).
'3 MOORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §101.06.
"Deepwater Ry. v. Western Pocanhontas Coal & Lumber Co., 152 Fed. 824
(C. C. S. D. W. Va. 1907) ; cf. Tillman v. Russo Asiatic Bank, 51 F. 2d 1023
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 539 (1931) (two causes of action joined, first
based on dishonor of plaintiff's check, second on refusal to pay own draft) ; Little
Six Oil Co. v. Noble, 17 F. 2d 728 (5th Cir. 1927) (action against contracting
party and one who has assumed his obligation) ; Alabama Power Co. v. Gregory
Hill Gold Mining Co., 5 F. 2d 705 (M. D. Ala. 1925) (condemnation proceedings); Wright v. Ankeny, 217 Fed. 988 (W. D. Wash. 1914) (liability of each
subscribing stockholder of insolvent corporation on stock subscription) ; Manufacturer's Comm. Co. v. Brown Alaska Co., 148 Fed. 308 (C. C. S. D. N. Y.
1906) (contracts and liability of maker of promissory note and several indorsers
thereon are separate and distinct).

19501

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Moreover, an important procedural rule had been developed under
this statute. Where under the state law s the plaintiff was allowed to
allege the liability of the defendants jointly, such as in the joint tortfeasor and master-servant cases, and he elected to do so, then the joint
allegation made it unnecessary to determine whether the suit could be
removed on the ground of separable or separate controversy. Such
joint allegation effectively barred consideration of the question of removability under the removal statutes prior to 1948, and the case was
deemed nonremovable. 9
In view of the uncertainty and the confusion caused by the language
of the old statute, Congress has adopted a new removal statute, which
provides that:
"Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action,
which would be removable if sued on alone, is joined with one or
more otherwise nonremovable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all
issues therein, or, at its discretion, may remand all matters not
within its original jurisdiction."'1o
Thus Congress has abolished "separable controversy" as a ground of
removal and has substituted therefor "a separate and independent claim
11
or cause of action."
The most significant result of the few decisions under the new statute
has been the apparent retention of the procedural rule under the old
statute that an allegation of concurrent negligence and joint liability bars
removal. Only two decisions, from the same district court, have been
' There is a conflict as to whether it is obligatory on the part of the federal
courts to follow state statutes and decisions in such cases. It has been held that
a state court decision on the removability to a federal court of a cause of action
pending before it, is not binding upon the federal court sitting in that jurisdiction; but a state court decision as to the nature of the obligation under the state
laws, as joint or several, which affects the right to remove, must be accepted by
the federal courts. Fournet v. De Vibliss, 24 F. Supp. 60 (W. D. La. 1938). Cases
collected in Note, 140 A. L. R. 733, 735 (1942).
0 "If a plaintiff alleges that the concurrent negligence of the railroad company
and its employee, Johnson, was the cause of his injury, he has a right to join
them in one action. If he elects to do so, it supplies no ground for removal because he might have sued them separately." Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Dowell,
229 U. S. 102 (1912); Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U. S. 534 (1939); Hay v.
May Department Stores Co., 271 U. S.318 (1926) ; McAllister v. Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 243 U. S.320 (1917) ; American Car and Foundry Co. v. Kettlehake, 236
U. S. 311 (1914); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Cockrell, Administrator, 232 U. S.
146 (1913) ; Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Schwyart, 227 U. S. 184 (1912) ; Chicago, B & Q. R. R. v. Willard, 220 U. S. 413 (1911); Southern Ry. v. Miller,
217 U. S.209 (1910) ; Illinois C. R. R. v. Sheegog, 215 U. S.308 (1909) ; Wecker
v. National Enameling Co., 204 U. S.176 (1906) ; Cincinnati, N. 0. & Tex. Pac.
Ry. v. Bohon, 200 U. S.221 (1905); Alabama & G. So. Ry. v. Thompson, 200
U. S.206 (1905); Chesapeake & 0. Ry. v. Dixon, 179 U. S.131 (1900); Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. v. Martin, 178 U. S.245 (1899).
0 28 U. S. C. §1441(c) (1949).
" For further discussion of the effect of §1441 (c), see MOORE, COmENTARY
ON THE U. S. JUDICIAL CODE §0.03(37)
(1949).
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opposed to this view. In Bentley v. Halliburton Oil Well Cementing
Co., the district court said, ". . . a separate and independent claim or
cause of action had been alleged against the defendant tortfeasor," and
allowed removal.' 2 This court ignored completely the concurrent negligence allegation. It followed up this decision with a like result in
Buckholt v. Dow Chemical Co., another joint tort-feasor case.' 3 The
court of appeals reversed the district judge in Bentley v. Halliburton
Oil Well Cementing Co., and remanded the case to the state court, saying, "Joint liability for the whole tort negatives the idea of a separate
and independent claim."' 14 Four district courts agreed with this latter
view under the new statute. 1'
In Butler Manufacturing Co. v. Wallace
& Tiernan Sales Corp., the district court in the absence of an allegation
of joint liability found it implied in the facts as set out in the complaint
and remanded the entire case to the state court. The district judge
said:
"Only separate and independent claims joined in one action,
which is sued on alone and within the original jurisdiction of
United States District Courts are now subject to removability.
In the instant case, it appears that the complaint charges a cause
of action for damages caused at a singular time and place by
separate wrongful acts of defendants. In light of the substantive
law of the State of Missouri the complaint can only be construed
to charge joint and several liability against the defendants. Consequently, no right of removal exists because of the existence of
'a separate and independent claim or cause of action' as asserted
6
by the removing defendent.'
Therefore the same procedural rule that applied to such cases under
the old statute applies equally under the new.
There was clearly an intent to change the right of removal under
this new statute by abolishing separable controversies and substituting
"a single and independent claim or cause of action." The federal court
under the old statute allowed removal in Texas Employers Insurance
Ass'n. v. Felt where three insurance carriers, two resident and one nonresident, were being sued in the alternative, since it was uncertain which
was liable under th Workman's Compensation Act.' 7 Now under the
new statute it seems evident that this removal would not be allowed
inasmuch as there was only one claim or cause of action asserted against
the defendants. In a joint tortfeasor case clearly there is but one cause
1281 F. Supp. 323 (S. D. Tex. 1948).
1281 F. Supp. 463 (S. D. Tex. 1948).

174 F. 2d 788 (5th Cir. 1949).
Board of Directors v. Whiteside, 87 F. Supp. 69 (W. D. Ark. 1949) ; Robinson v. Missouri Pac. Tran. Co., 85 F. Supp. 235 (W. D. Ark. 1949); Smith v.
Waldemar, 85 F. Supp. 36 (E. D. Tenn. 1949); English v. Atlantic C. L. Ry.,
80 F. Supp. 681 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
" 82 F. Supp. 635 (W. D. Mo. 1949).
17 150 F. 2d 227 (5th Cir. 1945).
i,

1"

1950]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

of action. It appears that under the prior statute, if the liability was
severally alleged, rather than jointly, a non-resident defendant could
remove the case. The new statute, however, would not allow removal
since there is only one claim or cause of action stated. Apparently it
is the intent of the revisors of the statute that a single claim sued on
may no longer be separated into parts so as to effect a removal of a
single claim or cause of action from a state to a federal court. In this
respect, the new statute may result in a decrease in the volume of federal litigation.' 8 A clear example of the type of case applying the new
statute, in which there are related but separate causes of action, is
McFadden v. Grace Lines, Inc.19 The complaint stated eleven causes
of action arising out of similar claims on shipments made by plaintiffs,
some on different dates. The district court, in its discretion, refused
to remand any of the causes and tried the entire case.
While the new statute may prove to be an improvement over the
earlier one, still the use of the language "separate and independent claim
or cause of action" leaves much to be desired in the matter of clarity.
What is mant by a "cause of action" has long been the subject of earnest
debate among the profession. 20 As one writer has said, "A lengthy period
of uncertainty will almost inevitably result from the adoption of
1441(c). '"21 The substantial rights of parties should not depend on
the unpredictable tests established under an uncertain statute, and hence
the need for a clearer statute is apparent. 22 Either a denial of the right
of removal, absent complete diversity between the parties,2 3 or a defini18 H. R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. A 134 (1947).
But see Wills and
Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdictionand Procedure,9 0rno
ST. L. J. 257 (1948), where it is said, "In another respect, however, section 1441
(c)may increase the amount of federal litigation in that it will permit removal of
suits containing entirely separate and independent causes of action, which are now
remanded under the separable controversy limitation. Thus, it is entirely conceivable that total federal litigation may increase."
1 82 F. Supp. 495 (S.D. N. Y. 1948).
"McCaskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. OF CHi. L. Rav. 281 (1937);
Wheaton, The Code Cause of Action, 22 CORN. L. Q. 1 (1936) ; Clark, The Cause
of Action, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 354 (1934) ; Harris, What Is a Cause of Action?, 16
CALIF'. L. Rxv. 459 (1928).
21 Wills and Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Relizoval .urisdiction and
Procedure, 9 OHio ST.L. J.257 (1948).
" "The most expedient and sensible approach to the separable controversy problem, however, would be to deny removal to diversity cases except where federal
jurisdiction exists under the rule in Strawbridge v. Curtiss [infra note 23] which
allows federal jurisdiction in diversity cases only where every plaintiff could sue
every defendant in the federal courts." Note, 42 ILL. L. REv. 105 (1948). Another
view is that "it would seem distinctly preferable to retain the separable controversy for the present. We have a large number of cases construing the clause.
Although these cases cannot be harmonized, they can at least be classified." Wills
and Boyer, Proposed Changes in Federal Removal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 9
Oio ST. L. J.257 (1948).
"This would be a return to the original grounds for removal as set out in
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch 267 (U. S. 1806) (All parties on one side of
the suit [plaintiffs] must be diverse in citizenship from all the parties on the other
[defendants] in order to have removal to the federal courts). See note 22 supra.
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tion of a "separate and independent claim or cause of action" for the
purposes of this statute, may lend certainty to this disputed area and
serve to effectuate the original intent of the revisors.
J. C. JoHNsoN, JR.
Municipal Corporations-Tort LiabilityGovernmental and Proprietary Functions
A municipal corporation is legally limited in its acts to those which
are for a public purpose.' The liability of a municipality in tort depends
upon whether the act complained of, even though committed in an
undertaking for a public purpose, is characterized as governmental or
proprietary. If the undertaking is characterized as governmental, then
there is no liability unless imposed by statute; if it is characterized as
proprietary, then the municipality is liable as any other corporation
would be.

2

In the case of Rhodes v. Asheville,3 the Supreme Court of North
Carolina was faced with the problem of determining in which of these
two categories the operation of a municipally owned airport fell. Plaintiff's intestate had been fatally wounded by a watchman employed at
the airport. In a resulting action for wrongful death, the municipal
defendants maintained that N. C. GEN. STAT. §63-50 (Supp. 1947) de-

clared such an operation to be a public, mtnicipal, governmental function
and that therefore no action would lie.4 Their demurrer was overruled

and they appealed. The Supreme Court, in affirming the lower court's
decision, held that the statute only declared such operation to be for a
public purpose. The Court then classified the undertaking as proprie1Nash v. Tarboro, 227 N. C. 283, 42 S. E. 2d 209 (1947) ; Airport Authority
v. Johnson, 226 N. C. 1, 36 S. E. 2d 211 (1944) ; Reidsville v. Slade, 224 N. C. 48,
29 S.
E. 2d 215 (1944).
2
Millar v. Wilson, 222 N. C. 340, 23 S. E. 2d 42 (1942) ; Parks v. Princeton,
217 N. C. 361, 8 S. E. 2d 217 (1940) ; Hodges v. Charlotte, 214 N. C. 737, 200
S. E. 889 (1938) ; Lewis v. Hunter, 212 N. C. 504, 193 S. E. 814 (1937) ; Broome
v. Charlotte, 208 N. C. 729, 182 S. E. 325 (1935) ; Cathey v. Charlotte, 197 N. C.
309, 148 S. E. 426 (1929); Scales v. Winston-Salem, 189 N. C. 469, 126 S. E.
543 (1925) ; James v. Charlotte, 183 N. C. 630, 112 S. E. 423 (1922) ; Snider v.
High Point, 168 N. C. 608, 85 S. E. 15 (1915); Harrington v. Greenville, 159
N. C. 632, 75 S. E. 849 (1912) ; Mcllhenney v. Wilmington, 127 N. C. 146, 37
S. E. 187 (1900).
Rhodes v. Asheville, 230 N. C. 134, 52 S. E. 2d 371 (1949).
' "The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports or other
air navigation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance,
equipment and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities, and the
exercise of any other powers herein granted to municipalities, are hereby declared
to be public, governmental and municipal functions exercised for a public purpose
and matters of public necessity, and such lands and other property, easements and
privileges acquired and used by such municipalities in the manner and for the
purposes enumerated in this article, shall are are hereby declared to be acquired
and used for public, governmental and municipal purposes and as a matter of public necessity." N. C. GEN. STAT. §63-50 (Supp. 1947).

